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Reaching the 1.5C target requires rapidly
phasing out fossil fuels. We investigate
whether such decline is feasible by
analyzing its historical precedents.
Historically, the fastest decline occurred
in smaller electricity markets, under lower
electricity demand growth, and in
response to energy security concerns.
There are no or rare historical precedents
for the required coal decline in Asia (most
scenarios) and OECD (one-half of
scenarios), as well as gas decline in the
Reforming Economies and Middle East
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https://doi.org/10.1016/j.oneear.2021.09.012SCIENCE FOR SOCIETY A major challenge in combatting climate change is stopping the use of fossil fuels
such as coal in electricity generation. This is particularly challenging in Asia—the largest global region with
rapidly growing electricity demand—where coal is widely used. Fast transitions to low-carbon power sour-
ces are needed, yet it is unclear whether historical precedents for such transitions exist. The most similar
shifts away from fossil fuels occurred in the 1970s and 1980s, when rapidly growing Western countries re-
placed oil with nuclear power and coal. Other cases of rapid decline in large countries involved switching
one fossil fuel to another or in post-socialist countries following the collapse of the Soviet Union. More
recently, the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) countries have been suc-
cessfully replacing coal with renewables, but electricity demand growth is lower in these countries, and fos-
sil fuel power plants are generally older. The findings from the study indicate that an unprecedented effort
will be required to decarbonize Asia’s energy sector and meet climate targets.SUMMARYTo limit global warming to 1.5C, fossil fuel use must rapidly decline, but historical precedents for such large-
scale transitions are lacking. Here we identify 147 historical episodes and policy pledges of fossil fuel decline
in 105 countries and global regions between 1960 and 2018.We analyze 43 cases in larger systemsmost rele-
vant to climate scenarios. One-half of 1.5C-compatible scenarios envision coal decline in Asia faster than in
any of these cases. The remaining scenarios as well as many scenarios for coal and gas decline in other
regions have precedents only where oil was replaced by coal, gas, or nuclear power in response to energy
security threats. Achieving the 1.5C target will be difficult in the absence of fossil fuel decline mechanisms
that extend far beyond historical experience or current pledges.INTRODUCTION
Mitigating dangerous climate change requiresmassive and rapid
shifts in the global energy system. The nature, scale, and speed
of the required changes are depicted in climate-energy-econ-
omy scenarios called climatemitigation pathways and systemat-
ically assembled by the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate
Change (IPCC) for its reports.3–6 The IPCC climate mitigation
pathways inspire and inform multiple sectoral, regional, and na-One Earth 4, 1477–1490, Octo
This is an open access article under the CC BY-Ntional roadmaps and scenarios such as the International Energy
Agency (IEA) Net Zero by 2050 Roadmap for the Energy Sector,7
the European Union (EU) 2050 long-term strategy,8 and China’s
vision for net zero emissions by 2060.9 It thus becomes increas-
ingly important to understand to which extent these strategies
are feasible. To answer this question, a growing body of litera-
ture10–13 assesses whether new low-carbon technologies and
infrastructure can expand fast enough.12–18 At the same time,
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France United Kingdom Russia
Figure 1. Illustrative episodes of decadal fossil fuel decline in electricity in the world, large regions, and countries
In each case, the declining episodes are highlighted in white with the 10-year decline rate (normalized to the size of the electricity system; see experimental
procedures).
(A, B, D, and E) These panels illustrate oil decline episodes following the oil crises combined with rising electricity demand and the growth of nuclear, gas, and
coal; (B) and (E) illustrate the recent decline in coal in the OECD and United Kingdom in the face of stagnant and falling demand replaced by growing renewables,
and (E) also illustrates the decline of coal in the UK in the 1990s as a result of natural gas exploration in the North Sea. (C) and (F) illustrate decline episodes
associated with the post-Soviet crisis and declining demand. Non-hydro renewables primarily include solar and wind power but also biomass.
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OPEN ACCESS Articletechnologies has not been assessed in the same systematic
way. However, the effectiveness of climate mitigation directly
depends on the rate of emission reductions, reflecting not the
expansion of low-carbon technologies, but the decline of car-
bon-intensive ones.
Due to constantly rising energy demand, historically, new en-
ergy sources and technologies have often added to, rather than
replaced, old ones,19,20 even when alternatives were available
(as illustrated in the case of the global electricity mix in Figure 1).
Even as natural gas and nuclear became available, the use of
coal continued to rise through the late twentieth and early
twenty-first century. However, this global rise has masked
decline in individual countries, where certain fuels or technolo-
gies were displaced by others that offered cheaper, better, or
more desirable energy services20 (Figure 1). For example,
many countries eliminated oil in electricity production following
the 1970s oil embargoes.21,22 More recently, a group of coun-
tries (dominated by wealthier economies with older coal power
fleets)23 committed to phase out the use of unabated coal in po-
wer production.24 Decline of fossil fuels in individual countries
has often been a protracted process. For example, the decline
of coal in the UK has taken more than half a century,25 and
coal phase-out in Germany, initiated in the 1980s,26 is still likely1478 One Earth 4, 1477–1490, October 22, 2021to take decades.23 This is because the flip side of the energy
transition,25 or exnovation,27 presents a distinct challenge that
can lead to stranded fossil fuel resources28–30 and infrastruc-
tures13,31–35 and resistance from affected workers and commu-
nities.36–39
In comparison, the IPCC 1.5C-compatible pathways indicate
that meeting climate targets requires rapid phase-out of fossil
fuels (Figure S1), including shortening lifetimes of fossil electricity
infrastructure to historically unprecedented levels.35,40 Fossil
fuels have to be phased out up to 50% faster if the deployment
of carbon capture and storage (CCS) and negative emission
technologies—a controversial component of most climate miti-
gation scenarios—is limited.41
In this paper, we ask whether there are historical precedents of
fossil fuel decline envisioned in the IPCC 1.5C-compatible sce-
narios. We find that many of these scenarios depict fossil fuel
decline rates that are either unprecedented or only have prece-
dents in historical responses to energy security threats, when
oil was substituted by coal or nuclear power in energy systems
much smaller than scenario macro-regions. This relates to coal
decline in Asia in all scenarios (except one), coal decline in the
Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development
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Figure 2. Historical decadal decline epi-
sodes as a function of system size and
compared with required coal and gas decline
rates in 1.5C-compatible scenarios
(A) Historical decline episodes with the color indi-
cating the primary type of substitution for episodes
with faster decline rates (over 5%) in larger systems
(>100 TWh) and national coal phase-out pledges
depicted with triangles. The line estimates the his-
torical relationship between themaximum observed
decline rates and the size of the energy system (see
experimental procedures). See Table S6 for country
codes.
(B) The regions, fuels, and time periods with the
highest decline rates in 1.5C-compatible sce-
narios5 (2020–2030 for natural gas in REF and coal
in OECD, Asia, and the world; 2030–2040 for natural
gas in MAF and the world). Colored dots show
decadal change rates in individual pathways, with
red circles depicting high overshoot, blue crosses
(x) depicting low overshoot, and the median shown
with a horizontal line. White diamonds show global
decline rates for the IEA’s NZE 2050 scenario. We show both negative and positive changes since the latter affect the median and IQR values for scenarios.
Decline ranges for all regions and fuels are shown in Figure S5. Median electricity system size is used for each fuel/region combination.
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OPEN ACCESSArticlegas decline in the Reforming Economies (REF), and also Middle
East and Africa in one-third to one-half of scenarios. This signals
both an enormous challenge of seeing through such rapid
decline of fossil fuels and the need to learn from historical les-
sons when rapid declines were achieved on the national scale.
RESULTS
Method summary
To analyze the feasibility of decline of fossil fuels, we compare
historical precedents of coal, oil, and natural gas decline in elec-
tricity production to the decline of these fuels needed to reach
the 1.5C climate target as envisioned in the IPCC 1.5C-
compatible pathways5,2 as well as in the IEA Net-Zero Emissions
by 2050 (NZE) scenario.7 We focus on fossil fuel use in electricity
since this sector is the first to decarbonize in cost-effective miti-
gation scenarios3,42.We also focus on the near term (2020–2050)
when decline rates are the highest and most unabated fossil fuel
use in electricity is phased out (Figure S1). Historically, we iden-
tify decadal episodes of decline between 1960 and 2018 using a
sample of 105 countries (Table S1), as well as five major world
regions (Table S2), and globally. We also consider recent na-
tional pledges to phase out coal.23
To compare these historical precedents with climate mitiga-
tion scenarios, we consider both the rate and the context of
decline. We normalize the rate of decline to the overall size of
the electricity system (total electricity supply) (experimental
procedures). We control for three high-level contextual charac-
teristics: the overall size of the electricity sector, the growth in
electricity demand, and how the declining fossil fuel is
substituted.
To analyze the feasibility of the decline required to meet
climate targets, we use feasibility spaces, a conceptual tool de-
signed to relate historical experience to future plans, projections,
or scenarios.43 Since we consider several contextual factors
affecting the feasibility of decline, we construct two feasibility
spaces: one, auxiliary, focused exclusively on the size of theelectricity sector and the other focused on the electricity demand
dynamics, which also considers the size of the system and the
nature of substitution (experimental procedures).
Historical episodes of fossil fuel decline
No primary energy source has declined globally since the begin-
ning of the industrial revolution.44 However, we identify 245
decadal decline episodes in fuels used for electricity production
in 105 individual countries with electricity production over 10
TWh/year (the level of Uruguay or Costa Rica today; Table S1)
and global regions, which occurred between 1960 and 2018. In
addition, several countries have recently pledged to phaseout un-
abatedcoal aspart of thePoweringPastCoal Alliance23 (Figure 2).
In 147 of these episodes and pledges (further collectively called
episodes), the decline in a fossil fuel as a share of total electricity
supply was more than 5% over a decade (Figure 2). We focus on
these cases because a slower decline does not signal a signifi-
cant technological shift or policy effort. Rapid decline has been
limited to small countries: out of 11 episodes with decline over
30%, 10 took place in countries with electricity production less
than 50 TWh/year (as in Denmark between 2007 and 2017) (Table
S3). In electricity systems between 100 and 1,000 TWh/year,
decline is slower than 25% in almost all episodes, with the excep-
tion of 30% coal decline in the UK between 2007 and 2017 (Table
S4). In major economies comparable in size with the global re-
gions in scenarios (over 1,000 TWh/year), historical decline has
rarely been faster than 10% except for the US, where coal
declined 19% between 2008 and 2018. The highest rates
observed in country groups such as the OECD (close to 10,000
TWh/year) are even slower, since they aggregate even more un-
even changes in the countries comprising these groups (Figure 3).
The most notable decline in these mega-systems is the decline of
coal in the OECD from 2008 to 2018 (11%). Not surprisingly,
worldwide declines of fossil fuels in electricity are rarer still, with
the only notable episode when oil fell by 5% of electricity supply
globally between 1977 and 1987 (Figure 1). The relationship be-




































































































































































































































































Figure 3. Fuel and technology substitution in the most significant historical decline episodes and selected climate change mitigation sce-
narios
Bars depict growth (above the horizontal axis) or decline (below the axis) of electricity sources and technologies in a particular period normalized to the total
electricity supply averaged between the start and the end of the period (experimental procedures). Numbers at the bottom of the bars indicate the normalized
decline rate in the fossil fuel defining the episode and numbers at the top of the bars indicate the normalized change in total electricity demand over the period. The
circle above each bar shows the average electricity system size during the episode. Episodes are coded with their country code, period, and declining fuel: e.g.,
FR74–84O is France, 1974–1984, oil decline (see Table S6 for country codes). The figure shows the 25 fastest historical decline episodes in larger systems (total
electricity supply >100 TWh/year); other significant historical episodes in larger systems are shown in Figure S6. Scenario bars show changes in selected regions
and time periods for illustrative pathways P3 and P2. See Figure S7 for more scenarios and regions.
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OPEN ACCESS Articleof decline holds for both individual countries, geographic macro-
regions (such as Asia), and country groups (such as the OECD)
(Figure S2). Rapid decline is less likely to occur in large electricity
systems, which include a greater diversity of power plants,
geographic regions, and socio-political interests. It is less likely
for the drivers of decline (technology development, supply-de-
mand dynamics, resource depletion, and regulations) to concur-
rently affect all elements of such heterogeneous systems. The
rates of decline envisioned in the Powering Past Coal Alliance
(PPCA) pledges are not out of the historically observed ranges
for countries of similar sizes.
These observations allow us to estimate a historically probable
frontier for fossil fuel decline rates based on the size of the elec-
tricity system (Figure 2). More cases of rapid decline in smaller
systems are likely the result of their greater homogeneity and
are not simply a statistical artifact resulting from more observa-
tions of such systems (experimental procedures; Note S1; Table
S5). The relationship between the system size and maximum
decline rate also holds if aggregated regions are excluded (Fig-
ure S3). These results are robust to adjusting for rebound, or1480 One Earth 4, 1477–1490, October 22, 2021an increase in the use of fossil fuels following their decline (Fig-
ure S4, experimental procedures).
To identify historical precedents relevant for comparison with
climate mitigation scenarios, we select all episodes of decline at
or faster than 5% per decade among countries with electricity
production exceeding 100 TWh/year at the start of the episode
(N = 37; Figure 3; Table S4). We do not consider decline in sys-
tems smaller than 100 TWh/year (approximately the size of Nor-
way or the Netherlands in 2019) because they are more than 15
times smaller than the smallest global region in the climate miti-
gation scenarios and, given the clear relationship between the
size of the system and the maximum decline rate (Figure 2), we
consider them less informative for assessing the feasibility of
decline needed for climate mitigation. To enable direct compar-
ison with scenarios, we also analyze decline episodes at or faster
than 5% globally and in the same five global regions that are
analyzed in scenarios: Asia, OECD, Latin America (LAM), Re-
forming Economies (REF), and the Middle East and Africa
(MAF). Overall, we analyze 37 national, five regional, and one
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Figure 4. Feasibility space with feasibility zones for fossil fuel decline based on historical precedents of decline under different demand
change in different system sizes
Historical episodes with 10-year decline rates faster than 5% in larger systems (>100 TWh/year) define the feasibility zones. For each episode, the total electricity
system size (mean of beginning and end of the episode) is indicated by the area of the circle, and the primary substitution by color (for larger systems we also
indicate the secondary substitution); see Table S4. Episodes are coded with their country code, period, and declining fuel. Zones A and B are defined by the
density of historical precedents, zone C contains no historical precedents in larger systems, and zone D contains only decline episodes in post-Soviet countries
following the collapse of the USSR (experimental procedures, Figure S8).
ll
OPEN ACCESSArticleDecline of fossil fuels in these episodes was the result of fuel
switching, technology substitution, or demand decline (Figures
3 and S6; Table S4; experimental procedures). Fuel switching
occurs when the declining fossil fuel is substituted by another
fossil fuel such that essentially the same infrastructure can be
used, reducing the need for premature plant retirement, which
potentially makes decline less challenging. The majority of fuel-
switching episodes were triggered by concerns over fuel imports
(particularly in the 1970s and 1980s following the oil crises),
declining or, on the other hand, newly discovered domestic
fuel reserves. The declining fuel in most fuel-switching episodes
was oil, which is both a source of the most serious energy secu-
rity concerns45 and has ample uses outside of the power sector.
In earlier fuel-switching cases, oil was swapped for coal: this
included the global swap of oil for coal in 1977–1987. In later
fuel-switching episodes, oil and coal were primarily substituted
by natural gas, such as in the US following the shale gas revolu-
tion of the last decade (Figure 3) or in the UK’s North Sea gas
exploration, which spurred its coal decline in the 1990s.
The need for new power generation infrastructure can slow
down decline, especially if this infrastructure is capital intensive,
such as nuclear power plants, wind turbines, or solar panels. Nu-
clear power played a primary role in replacing oil and coal inFrance; oil, gas, and coal in Germany; and oil in Japan and the
OECD region in the 1970s–1980s and a secondary role in replac-
ing oil in the UK, Spain, and the world in the 1970s–1990s, and
coal in the UK in the 1980s–1990s. In all these cases, nuclear po-
wer was expanded in response to concerns over security of im-
ported or rapidly depleting domestic fossil fuels. Both fuel
switching and nuclear substitution episodes generally occurred
in parallel with strong electricity demand growth46 (Table S4;
Figure 4).
In the last two decades, fossil fuels in OECD countries were
substituted with solar and wind power, which played a primary
role in coal decline in the UK, Australia, Germany, and the
OECD, oil in Japan, and gas in Spain and Italy, as well as contrib-
uting to coal decline in the US and Spain. Switching to decentral-
ized and variable electricity sources such asmodern renewables
requires adjustments in the way electricity grids are operated,
which may also slow down decline by adding an additional level
of complexity. This occurred during increasing concerns over
climate change and declining costs of solar and wind power
technologies. In contrast to earlier episodes, electricity demand
stagnated or declined during these episodes. Demand decline
was sufficiently steep to play a primary role in oil and coal










































































Figure 5. Ten-year decline rates and demand change in scenarios projected on the feasibility space defined by historical episodes
Colored areas represent feasibility zones (experimental procedures, Figure S8). Each point represents changes in fossil fuel and electricity demand in an indi-
vidual 1.5C-compatible pathway for the respective fuel, region, and period. Point color and shape depict the pathway status in terms of overshoot.6 Demand
change is calculated using the same method as fossil fuel decline (experimental procedures). For each combination of fuel and region, the period with the largest
median decline rate between 2020 and 2050 is presented andmarked in the upper left corner. In the bottom right corner, themedian system size for the respective
region and period is shown. A datapoint for a single pathway is beyond the boundaries of the MAF/coal panel (WITCH-GLOBIOM 4.2/ADVANCE_2020_1.5C-
2100 with a decrease in demand more than 40%).
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OPEN ACCESS ArticleUnion, which led to the collapse of many energy-intensive indus-
tries47 and took place when the entire electricity system in the
REF region shrank by more than 25% between 1988 and 1998.
More recent decline of coal in Ukraine reflected the armed con-
flict in Donbas, where most coal deposits are concentrated. De-
mand decline also contributed to the recent decrease of coal and
gas in the UK.Feasibility space for fossil fuel decline
To relate the empirical evidence to the future scenarios, we first
construct a historical feasibility space (Figure 4) and then map
1.5C pathways onto it (Figure 5). Feasibility spaces have been
proposed and used to identify combinations of conditions that
enable a given climate action in different contexts.43 Previous
studies have used feasibility spaces to establish a dynamic feasi-
bility frontier, which separates conditions in which climate ac-
tions are feasible from those where it is not feasible.23 Here,
similar to Cherp et al.,18 we further develop the feasibility space
approach through feasibility zones based on the presence and
significance of historical precedents that occurred under spe-
cific circumstances of demand growth, electricity system size,
and the nature of technologies substituting fossil fuels. Electricity1482 One Earth 4, 1477–1490, October 22, 2021demand growth defines a key dimension of the feasibility space.
Faster demand growth makes rapid decline of fossil fuels less
likely because it requires more rapid expansion of substituting
technologies, including investment, construction of infrastruc-
ture, and adjustment of markets and supply chains. When
electricity demand is declining because of recessions, economic
restructuring, advances in energy efficiency, or lifestyle changes,
fossil fuels may also decline with little or no substitution required.
Figure 4 shows a feasibility space of fossil fuel decline based
on the historical episodes of decline faster than 5% in systems
larger than 100 TWh/year (37 national, five regional, and one
global episode; Table S4). We identify four feasibility zones of
decline characterized by differing frequency and nature of histor-
ical precedents (Figure 4). We define the first two zones (A and B)
by using an algorithm that determines, for each combination of
decline rate and demand change, the frequency of historical
decline episodes with faster decline rates or higher demand
growth, weighted by system size (Figure S8; experimental
procedures).
d Zone A includesmany historical episodes in electricity sys-
tems of all sizes and featuring all types of substitution,
including by renewables. It covers moderate (slower than
ll
OPEN ACCESSArticle20%) fossil fuel decline under slow or moderate (slower
than 15%) demand growth or up to15% demand decline
as well as slower rates of decline (5 to 15%) under
faster demand growth (15%–45%).
d Zone B includes significantly fewer episodes and only in
countries with electricity systems smaller than 600 TWh/
year (the largest being Japan in ca. 1980) and involving
only fossil fuel switch or substitution by nuclear power,
with one exception of coal decline in the UK in 2007–
2017, which involved both demand decline and substitu-
tion by wind power (Figure 3). Zone B covers the same
decline ranges as zone A under higher (up to 60% and
75%) demand growth as well as faster (20% to 30%)
fossil fuel decline.
d Zone C does not include any historical precedents of
decadal fossil fuel decline between 1960 and 2018 in sys-
tems with electricity supply over 100 TWh/year.
d Finally, zone D covers fossil fuel decline rates up to 30%
under demand decline faster than 15%. Historical epi-
sodes within zone D include only former Soviet countries
where decline of fossil fuels was driven by the economic
collapse of the 1990s.1.5C-compatible scenarios compared with historical
cases of decline
Figure 5 shows the decadal decline rates of coal and gas in the
global regions envisioned in the IPCC 1.5C-compatible sce-
narios plotted against the electricity demand growth in the
same scenarios and mapped onto the feasibility zones pre-
sented in Figure 4. Among all fossil fuels, coal would need to
decline most rapidly to meet climate targets. Globally, coal is
phased out by 2050 in about two-thirds of 1.5C-compatible
scenarios (Figure S1) with worldwide median decline rate of
19% in 2020–2030 (the same rate of coal decline is envisioned
in the IEA NZE 2050 roadmap).7 The median rate of coal decline
is similar between scenarios with and without CCS (Figures S1
and S9). The most rapid decline would need to occur in Asia
and the OECD regions where most of the coal generation capac-
ity is concentrated (Figures 5 and S10; Table S7; Data S1).
For the purposes of this analysis, we distinguish between high
and low overshoot scenarios. High-overshoot scenarios allow
more emissions and a higher rise in greenhouse gas concentra-
tion, which is subsequently compensated by deploying more
negative emission technologies (such as bioenergy with carbon
capture and storage [BECCS], massive afforestation, or atmo-
spheric carbon dioxide removal) in the second half of the cen-
tury. Both high- and low-overshoot scenarios envision similarly
fast coal decline in the OECD concentrated in 2020–2030 with
a median rate of 18% (inter-quartile range [IQR], 14% to
20%). Historical precedents for fossil fuel decline and demand
change envisioned in scenarios can be identified by mapping
these rates onto the feasibility space (Figure 4) as illustrated in
Figure 5 and summarized in Table S8 and Data S1. Out of 69 sce-
narios, 35 envision decline rates that are either unprecedented
(zone C) or historically only observed in economies with elec-
tricity supply at least 20 times smaller than in the OECD region
and involving fossil fuel switching or nuclear substitution
following the oil crises (zone B). In contrast, in climate mitigationscenarios, coal in the OECD is primarily replaced by renewables
(Figure S7). Nevertheless, about half of all scenarios envision
decline of coal in the OECD with rates that have multiple prece-
dents and diverse types of substitution (zone A). However, the
OECD is larger than most countries and regions where historical
decline was observed, so that the closest historical precedent of
comparable size is the decline of coal in the OECD from 2008 to
2018 with a decline rate of 11% (Figure 2). This episode
involved primary substitution by renewables, but was slower
than the decline envisioned in about 90% of scenarios and
occurred under 1% demand growth while the median demand
growth in scenarios for the OECD from 2020 to 2030 is 12%.
Coal decline in Asia is faster than in the OECD but also encom-
passes awider range of rates across the scenarios. In this region,
there is earlier and faster decline in low-temperature overshoot
scenarios and later and somewhat slower decline in high-tem-
perature overshoot scenarios, which in most cases require
more extensive use of negative emission technologies. In most
of the low-overshoot scenarios, coal decline is concentrated in
2020–2030, where the median decline rate is 31% (IQR,
37% to25%). The only low-overshoot scenarios that envision
coal decline in Asia in 2020–2030 with more frequent precedents
(zone A) feature the introduction of an economy-wide and world-
wide carbon tax in 2020 that suppresses demand growth;48
these scenarios also require faster coal decline in 2030–2040,
rarely seen historically (zone B). Thus, two-thirds of low-over-
shoot scenarios require coal decline in Asia that do not have
any historical precedents (zone C), and the remaining one-third
requires decline with only rare historical precedents (zone B)
(Figure 5; Tables 1 and S8). In high-overshoot scenarios, coal
decline in Asia spans 2020–2030 (median decline rate 19%)
and 2030–2040 (median decline rate 15%). About one-third
(10) of these scenarios envision unprecedented decline rates in
one of these periods (zone C) and all but one of the remaining
scenarios envision the rates with only rare historical precedents
(zone B) (Table 1; Figure 5; Table S8). In summary, all climate
mitigation scenarios require coal decline in Asia that is either un-
precedented or only has precedents in countries with at least 20
times smaller electricity supply and where fossil fuels were
substituted by other fossil fuels or nuclear power. Similarly to
the world as a whole, median decline rates of coal in OECD
and Asia are almost not affected by the availability of CCS (Fig-
ure S9), since most scenarios envision that coal decline would
need to occur faster than the CCS technology can be sufficiently
widely deployed.
Decline of coal in Asia has one significant precedent in a region
of similar size: the recent decline of coal in the OECD (the elec-
tricity supply in Asia will be similar to OECD in 2020–2030 and
about 40% larger in 2030–2040). The recent decline rate of
coal in the OECD (11%) was almost three times lower than
themedian rate of decline envisioned in low-overshoot scenarios
in Asia (31%), and about two times lower than in high-over-
shoot scenarios (19%). Furthermore, the OECD decline
occurred under demand growth of 1%, whereas climate mitiga-
tion scenarios envision median decadal demand growth in Asia
of 27%. The age of coal power plants at the start of the OECD
decline was 31 years,49 while the average age of power plants
in Asia in 2020 is 12 years.50 Finally, many other economic and
socio-political conditions in the OECD can make it difficult toOne Earth 4, 1477–1490, October 22, 2021 1483
Table 1. Decline of fossil fuels in scenarios in relation to feasibility zones determined by historical episodes of decline
















Coal OECD 2020–2030 low
and high
12 18% (20% to 14%) 0 33 33 2 69*
Coal Asia 2020–2030 low 12 31% (37% to 25%) 0 6** 6 23 35
Coal Asia 2020–2030 high 12 19% (27% to 1%) 10 3 14 7 34
Coal Asia 2030–2040 high 17 15% (19% to 10%) 3 5 23 3 34
Gas REF 2020–2030 low 1.6 16% (28% to 9%) 7 12 15 11 45
Gas REF 2030–2040 high 1.6 17% (21% to 6%) 8 6 14 4 34***
Gas MAF 2020–2030 low 2.4 8% (20% to +3%) 20 11 5 9 45
Gas MAF 2030–2040 high 4.1 14% (23% to 0%) 13 1 9 11 34
Notes: The table summarizes the average fossil fuel decline rates as well as the number of scenarios in which fossil fuel decline rates fall into different
feasibility zones. It covers regions, periods, and scenario types (high or low overshoot) where fossil fuel decline rates in a significant number of sce-
narios have no or rare historical precedents (see Data S1). (*) The sum also includes one scenario in zone D (crises-driven decline); (**) low-overshoot
scenarios with economy and worldwide imposition of carbon tax in 202048 that require coal decline in Asia in zone B in 2030–2040; (***) the sum also
includes two scenarios in zone D.
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to Asia.
Decline of natural gas in climate mitigation scenarios is not as
coordinated and universal as decline of coal because, in some
pathways, gas is a ‘‘bridge fuel’’ to a low-carbon future51 (Figures
S1 and S10). Globally, the median rate of gas decline across
scenarios is fastest in 2030–2040 (5%; Figure 2). The IEA NZE
scenario7 envisions no gas decline in 2020–2030, but a twice
as fast decline (11%) in 2030–2040. At the same time, many sce-
narios envision more rapid decline of gas in gas-producing re-
gions of MAF and REF (former Soviet Union, Russia being the
largest member of this group). Low-overshoot scenarios envi-
sion the fastest decline (16%, IQR 28% to 9%) of gas in
REF in 2020–2030 with two-thirds of the pathways having no
or rare precedents (zones C or B) in either 2020–2030 or 2030–
2040. High-overshoot scenarios envision moderate decline in
2020–2030 followed by faster decline in 2030–2040 (median
17%, IQR21% to6%) with close to two-thirds of pathways
having no precedents or only rare precedents (including cases of
rapid demand decline following the collapse of the USSR). About
one-third of scenarios do not envision unprecedented rates of
gas decline in the REF region. Among the low-overshoot sce-
narios whose gas decline rates in REF have many historical pre-
cedents (zone A), the majority envision economy-wide and
worldwide carbon tax imposed in 202048 (Table S8).
Scenarios envision similar patterns of natural gas decline in
MAF. In low-overshoot scenarios, gas declines by 14%
(20% to +3%) in 2020–2030, with unprecedented or rarely
seen rates in about one-third of scenarios (Table 1). In high-over-
shoot scenarios, gas grows on average by 15% (8% to +24%)
in 2020–2030 and then declines by 14% in 2030–2040 (23%
to 0%), with unprecedented rates in about one-third of sce-
narios. Altogether, one-third of scenarios envision unprece-
dented (zone C) gas decline rates in MAF, and in one-fifth of
scenarios rates have rare precedents (zone B) (Tables 1 and
S8; Figure 5). In both MAF and REF, the size of electricity sys-
tems in 2020–2040 (1.6 PWh/year in REF and 2.4–4.1 PWh/1484 One Earth 4, 1477–1490, October 22, 2021year in MAF) is closer to that of the largest countries such as
the US or Japan or historical regions with decline precedents
(Figure 2), which enables more direct comparison of scenarios
with historical episodes than in the case of Asia and the OECD.
In scenarios where CCS is available, decline rates for gas in
both regions, especially in MAF, are less ambitious (Figure S9).
Climate mitigation scenarios also envision decline of coal and
gas in the remaining regions; however, the rates of decline in
most scenarios have multiple historical precedents (Figure 5;
Table S8). Finally, the use of oil in electricity production is already
limited and thus requires rapid decline in climate mitigation path-
ways. Oil accounts for 3% of global electricity supply, 43% of
which is concentrated in the MAF,1 which is the only region
where moderate decline occurs both in 2020–2030 and 2030–
2040 (Figure S10; Table S7).
We conduct a sensitivity analysis, which considers 20-
instead of 10-year decline periods (Figure S11). Historical
20-year decline episodes generally have similar or slower
decline to 10-year episodes, because many of the 10-year ep-
isodes are preceded or followed by growth (Figure 1). In the
particular case of the most recent 10-year episodes (such as
decline of coal in OECD in 2008–2018), we simply are not
able to observe their potential continuation into the future. In
contrast, in climate mitigation scenarios, fossil fuels rarely
grow, which means that decline is almost always faster when
measured over 20 years. In particular, this is true with respect
to coal in Asia and gas in REF andMAF (Figure S12). Thismeans
that the gap between historical precedents and what is de-
picted in scenarios is even higher when the decline of fossil
fuels is measured over 20 years.
DISCUSSION
This paper contributes to understanding whether and where the
feasibility of reducing the use of fossil fuels in electricity poses
a challenge to meeting climate targets. Earlier research
concluded that limiting temperature overshoot would require
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41,52 Our analysis
identifies whether there have been historical precedents for
such decline. We show that, historically, decline of fossil fuels
has been slower in larger countries and regions and under strong
demand growth. The fastest decline in the past primarily involved
substitution of one fossil fuel by another fossil fuel (e.g., the
replacement of coal or oil with natural gas) or nuclear power.
Many climate change mitigation scenarios envision decline of
coal in Asia and OECD and gas in the REF and MAF regions
that is notably different from these historical patterns. In inter-
preting these results it is important to keep in mind the limitations
of comparing historical caseswith future scenarios. These limita-
tions reflect the obvious fact that the future is always different
from the past, including in ways potentially significant for fossil
fuel decline, such as the emergence of new technologies, pol-
icies, and public attitudes. Furthermore, from our vantage point
at present, it is hard or even impossible to foresee some of these
developments. This, however, does not mean that comparing
the actual past with desirable futures is futile. On the contrary,
such comparison helps to better understand the nature and
scale of future challenges; i.e., in our case, where future fossil
fuel decline should be most different from the past and also
which historical episodes provide the most relevant lessons for
future decline.
Most importantly, we find that half of the IPCC climate mitiga-
tion pathways—including both high and low overshoot—envi-
sion coal decline in Asia that does not have any historical
precedents, and the other half envision decline that only has pre-
cedents in economies with electricity demand at least 20 times
smaller and involving fossil fuel switching or substitution of fossil
fuels by nuclear power following the oil crises. Such rates will be
difficult to achieve in Asia, where the coal power plant fleet is
young35,40 and linked to domestic coal extraction. There were
hopes that the coronavirus pandemic (COVID-19) would slow
or even reverse the expansion of coal in Asia; however, in
2020, China increased the permitting rate for new coal plants,
and in the rest of Asia there has been little change to coal power
planning.53 China has recently announced a halt to overseas coal
financing54 and a net zero target by 2060,9 but it does not neces-
sarily imply phasing out coal faster than historically observed
rates. In a recent analysis of electricity markets, the IEA expects
coal power capacity in China to rise until 2025 before eventually
plateauing and foresees similar trends in other Asian countries.55
The difficulties of phasing out coal in Asia are also signaled by In-
donesia’s recent announcement to use coal well into the 2050s56
as well as the failure of G20 countries57 to agree on a rapid coal
phase-out in the run-up to COP26.
Beyond Asia, many IPCC climate mitigation pathways envi-
sion fossil fuel decline rates with frequent historical precedents;
however, coal decline in the OECD and natural gas decline in
major gas exporting regions (REF and MAF) have rare or no pre-
cedents in a substantial proportion of 1.5C scenarios.
More than half of 1.5C scenarios envision coal decline in the
OECD that has rare precedents. However, coal power in OECD
countries already dropped by a third (corresponding to 11% of
the total electricity supply) from 2008 to 2018, and this drop
was accelerated during the COVID-19 pandemic in 2020.58
While this decline rate is only compatible with about 10% of
1.5C scenarios, more rapid declines in the US from 2008 to2018 (19%), the UK from 2007 to 2017 (30%), and Germany’s
coal exit pledge (24%) indicate that faster rates are possible
even in larger OECD countries. Given the aging power plant
fleets in OECD economies and their track record of transitions
away from coal,23,25,26 it may be possible to scale up these
decline rates to the OECD region as a whole, as envisioned in
most 1.5C scenarios.
Finally, many IPCC 1.5C-compatible scenarios envision gas
decline rates that are either unprecedented or have rare prece-
dents in REF (two-thirds of 1.5C scenarios) and MAF (one-half
of 1.5C scenarios). Whilemany low-overshoot scenarios require
unprecedented rates already in 2020–2030, many high-over-
shoot scenarios envision the initial growth of gas as a bridge
fuel followed by fast decline in 2030–2040. Achieving unprece-
dented rates of gas decline in either REF or MAF seems chal-
lenging given both regions’ vast natural gas resources and
slow progress in deploying modern renewables. An additional
problem in MAF may be young power plants due to the recent
rapid growth of gas power generation (Figure S13; Table S9).
Historical precedents of fossil fuel decline offer several lessons
for addressing these future challenges. The first lesson is that past
decline of fossil fuels was driven by technological innovations.
Some of the faster decline episodes involving switching from
coal to natural gas required not only new resource discoveries
but also innovations in extraction (such as offshore, fracking)
and transportation (such as liquefied natural gas [LNG]). However,
fossil fuel switching cannot be a long-term climate solution: the
natural gas sector has been responsible for the largest growth
inCO2 emissions over the last decade.
59 Even faster rates of fossil
fuel decline were achieved in the 1970s–1980s from substituting
oil with nuclear power, a low-carbon technology that can lead to
emission reductions. However, nuclear power is currently in
decline, at least in most countries that historically led its expan-
sion.60 More recently, cost decline and other advances in solar
and wind power led to these technologies displacing coal and,
in some cases, gas. Even though the rate of this displacement
may accelerate in the future, it has so far been slower than what
is required in the majority of scenarios for the OECD and all sce-
narios in Asia.18 Moreover, displacing coal with renewables has
been limited to OECD countries with slow or shrinking electricity
demand (Figure 4). Beyond renewables and nuclear, some
climate mitigation scenarios61,62 envision energy demand reduc-
tion as a major emission reduction strategy. Although we show
that moderate decline of fossil fuels hasmore frequently occurred
under slower demand growth, demand reduction was not thema-
jor cause of fossil fuel decline in most historical episodes except
those linked to the collapse of the USSR (Figure 4). Although elec-
tricity demand reduction caused by the COVID-19 pandemic has
contributed to a decline in the use of coal,58,63 this decline is un-
likely to be of the speed and scale needed to meet climate
targets.64 In summary, while technological advances have been
necessary for fossil fuel decline, no single technology seems to
be poised to deliver the decline required for reaching climate tar-
gets, and thus deploying technology mixes will be essential.
Another technology thatmay be relevant to the future rate of fossil
fuel decline is CCS. Gas decline rates could be significantly
dampened if CCS is deployed fast enough; however, the availabil-
ity of CCS has almost no effect on the urgency of coal power
phase-out in scenarios (Figure S9).One Earth 4, 1477–1490, October 22, 2021 1485
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fuel decline almost always involved not only technological ad-
vances but also strong state policies. The rapid phase-out of
oil in the 1970s–1980swas driven by concerns over energy secu-
rity, and the introduction of nuclear power and other strategies of
this period required considerable state intervention.21,65 More
recently, policies to reduce the use of fossil fuels have beenmoti-
vated by concerns over climate change. So far, the pledges to
phase out unabated coal made by the members of the Powering
Past Coal Alliance23 in response to the Paris Agreement (2015)
do not envision phasing out coal faster than historically observed
rates (Figure 2) and have been limited to wealthy countries that
produce and use less coal and have aging power plant fleets.23
The recent commitment of China to net zero emission by 2060 is
another example of a new climate policy, although it remains to
be seen whether it will imply phasing out coal faster than histor-
ically observed rates. More broadly, state policies stimulated the
recent expansion of renewables,66,67 and carbon prices68 have
encouraged the switch from coal to natural gas. These policies
succeeded where they have managed to address multiple com-
plexities, including the need to destabilize fossil fuel sectors to
trigger their decline and at the same time address concerns of
affected stakeholders and the distributional consequences of
phase-out. Weakening coal regimes can take a long time, as in
the case of the UK, which started such efforts in the 1980s25
and achieved the fastest historically observed decline of 30%
some 30 years later (from 2007 to 2017). This shows that decline
can undergo non-linear accelerations after years of gradual
destabilization; however, it may be difficult to replicate over the
short term, particularly in major coal-consuming countries with
younger plants and vigorous domestic coal production.23 By
2007, the average age of coal plants in the UK was 35 years,
compared with 12 years in China today.49 It is not a coincidence
that China, South Korea, and other Asian countries with large
and younger coal fleets aim for net zero emissions for 2060,
about four decades from now. Transitions away from coal in
such cases inevitably trigger resistance from various social ac-
tors associated with the coal sector and invoke the issue of dis-
tribution of costs and benefits of fossil fuel decline.69,70 This ex-
plains the need for policies that are able to navigate these
interests by going beyond the weakening and destabilization of
fossil fuel sectors and addressing the challenge of ‘‘just transi-
tions,’’ as exemplified by the recent German strategy of coal
exit developed in cooperation with stakeholders in affected re-
gions and industries, including companies, workers, and
communities.71
The final lesson from historical precedents is that political
motivation alone is not enough to implement sufficiently strong,
nuanced, and long-term policies leading to fossil fuel decline.
What is required in addition is strong state capacity. Most histor-
ical episodes took place in technologically advanced countries
with strong governance capacities signaled by their economic
wealth, strength of democracy, political stability, and high social
capital. The importance of economic and institutional capacities
has been documented in the case of introducing nuclear po-
wer,72 broader response to the oil crises,21 coal phase-out
pledges,23 and expansion of renewable energy.66 In a globalized
world, technological and political capacity is located not only
in individual countries but also in international networks facili-1486 One Earth 4, 1477–1490, October 22, 2021tating the flows of finances, technology, ideas, and political influ-
ences. The centrality of international cooperation has been
documented with respect to manymechanisms involved in fossil
fuel decline ranging from an earlier switch to nuclear power73,74
to the recent coal phase-out pledges75 and the adoption of
renewables.18,76,77
These three lessons mean that the scale and speed of fossil
fuel decline envisioned in the majority of the IPCC 1.5C-
compatible scenarios would require adopting low-carbon tech-
nologies at least as fast as nuclear power was adopted in the
second half of the last century; political motivations at least as
strong as in the past responses to oil crises; economic and insti-
tutional capacities comparable with those of Western countries;
and worldwide economic, technological, and policy coopera-
tion. Since all of these requirements are very challenging, sce-
narios where fossil fuel decline rates are more explicitly aligned
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Materials availability
Not applicable to this study.
Data and code availability
For the identification of historical decline episodes, we used data from IEA
World Energy Balances,1 and for the identification of decline rates in scenarios
we used data available from the IPCC 1.5C Scenario Explorer and Data2 as
described in experimental procedures. The code used in the analysis (for
calculating historical fossil fuel decline rates and those in scenarios, building
a feasibility space for fossil fuel decline, and a feasibility heatmap) and the da-
tasets generated during the study (a list of significant decline episodes, fossil
fuel decline rates in climate scenarios, and a feasibility heatmap for scenarios)
are available as: Vinichenko V., Cherp A., Jewell J. (2021). Code and data for
‘‘Historical precedents and feasibility of rapid coal and gas decline required
for the 1.5C target’’ (a One Earth article), version 1.0: https://zenodo.org/
record/5532577. Fossil fuel decline feasibility heatmap for 1.5C-compatible
scenarios is also available as a supplemental data file Data S1.
Defining sample for historical analysis
For the historical analysis, we define our national sample as all countries with
total electricity supply over 10 TWh/year. This covers 105 countries with the
largest electricity systems accounting for over 97% of electricity production
today (Table S1). We excluded very small countries for two reasons. First, in
very small countries, relatively small-scale physical changes in the electricity
system, like installing or retiring a single generation unit, would lead to a large
decline rate at the national level. Second, in these countries, electricity sys-
tems are often not systems in the strictest sense but rather part of electricity
systems of larger neighboring countries. For example, Luxembourg, a small
country in Europe, imports three-fourths of its total electricity supply.1
We identify 37 national cases where decline is over 5% per decade in sys-
tems over 100 TWh/year, which we consider most relevant for climate change
mitigation and analyze in more detail, as described below. Additionally, we
calculate historical decline for the five regions, matching the regions from
the IPCC 1.5C Scenario Explorer and Data2 as closely as possible (Table
S2), and identify an additional five cases of rapid decline in global regions
where decline exceeds 5%. We also identify one global case of significant
decline. These 37 national cases, five regional cases, and one global case
where decline is faster than 5% per decade in systems over 100 TWh/year
are the focus of our substitution analysis (Figure 3) and the basis for our feasi-
bility space for decline (see ‘‘Constructing a feasibility space for fossil fuel
decline’’ below).
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For the analysis of future scenarios to meet the 1.5C target, we use all 1.5C-
compatible pathways from the IPCC 1.5C Scenario Explorer and Data5,2
(Version 2.0). In our analysis, we distinguish between low- or no-overshoot
and high-overshoot pathways as defined in the database. For each pathway,
we conduct our analysis for each of the five regions that are reported: Asia, Latin
America (LAM), the Middle East and Africa (MAF), OECD, and the Reforming
Economies (REF) – corresponding to the former Soviet Republics – Table S2.Calculating decline rates
To calculate decline rates, we use electricity output of a given technology,
because this is directly linked to carbon dioxide emissions and therefore is
the most relevant for climate analysis.
We calculate the decline rates as a change in electricity generation from a
given source expressed as percentage of the average system size at the




 2 (Equation 1)
where:
- Si1 is electricity generation from a given source (i) at the end of the
decline period
- Si0 is electricity generation from the same source (i) at the beginning of
the period
- T0 and T1 are the total electricity supply (the size of the electricity system)
at the beginning and the end of the period, respectively
The total electricity supply represents the total amount of electricity used
within a given entity (country or region). It is calculated as total domestic elec-
tricity productionminus electricity exports plus electricity imports (Equation 2).
T = P E + I (Equation 2)
where:
- P is total electricity production
- E is total electricity exports
- I is total electricity imports
Normalizing the decline to the overall electricity supply accounts for how sig-
nificant a decline episode is in relation to the entire electricity system, rather
than in relation to the individual energy source. For example, consider an elec-
tricity generation source that generates 50 GWh, or 5% of a country’s elec-
tricity supply, and falls to 25 GWh over 10 years. If we were to measure the
decline of this source in relation to itself, the decline rate would be 50%, which
would not account for the fact that the source itself is relatively unimportant in
the overall electricity system. Since we are interested in decline in the broader
context, normalized decline is a more useful metric.
Since the total electricity supply changes over time, in our main analysis we
use the average of the total electricity supply over the time period (T0 + T12 ) for
normalization. We also conduct a sensitivity analysis where we normalize
decline to the total electricity supply at the beginning (T0) and the end (T1) of
the episode, which does not qualitatively change our findings (Figure S15).
When calculating historical decline rates, we correct for the fact that elec-
tricity production can fluctuate on an annual basis by smoothing the historical
data from the IEA Energy Balances1 using 3-year running averages. We then
calculate 10-year decline rates for all countries in our sample and for the five
regions that match the regions from the IPCC 1.5C Scenario Explorer and
Data.2 For each country or region, we identify the non-overlapping decline ep-
isodes with the highest decline rates.
In our main analysis, we omit 97 decline episodes in which the declining
source returns to the initial level within 10 years of the end of the episode.
We also include a sensitivity analysis where, in addition to omitting these ep-
isodes with full rebound, we adjust the decline rates in the remaining episodes
for the partial rebound that happens within 10 years of the end of the decline
episode (Figures S4 and S16). We also conduct a sensitivity analysis using
20-year periods rather than 10-year periods (Figure S11).We also estimate decline rates implied by pledges of members of the PPCA,
an initiative launched in 2016 whose members have committed to phase out
unabated coal power generation.23,78 To do so, we identify the starting year
that would provide the maximum decline rate (Yearmax ) and project the
maximum possible decline rate based on the pledged phase-out date(s)23
assuming that coal-fired generation declines from the amount in the starting
year (Smax ) to zero in the pledged phase-out year (Yearphaseout ). As Figure S17
illustrates, this prevents underestimating decline rates, which could happen if
we only assumed the decline between the most recent year for which gener-
ation data are available and the pledged phase-out date. Since total electricity
supply in the future phase-out year is unavailable, in this calculation we use to-
tal electricity supply in the last year for which data are available ðTlastÞ as the
electricity system size. To make these data comparable with our other obser-





Yearphaseout  Yearmax (Equation 3)
For climate mitigation scenarios, we calculate decline rates for each decade
between 2020 and 2050 for electricity generation from each fuel in each region
and globally using the IPCC 1.5C Scenario Explorer and Data5,2 (Version 2.0).
We do that for all 1.5C-compatible scenarios where electricity generation
data are available (85 global, 79 for MAF and REF, 69 for Asia and OECD,
and 68 for LAM). We conduct the two sensitivity analyses on the decline rates
in future scenarios that could affect our results: using total electricity supply at
the beginning and end of the period rather than the average (Figure S15) and
using 20-year rather than 10-year time periods (Figures S11 and S12).
Calculating demand change and defining fuel substitution
We consider the concurrent change in electricity demand and substitution of
the declining fuels as important contextual factors of fossil fuel decline in addi-
tion to the electricity system size (Figures 3, S6, and S7). We define electricity
demand as the total amount of electricity consumed within the given entity
(losses included), so it is numerically equivalent to total electricity supply (total
electricity production adjusted for net imports; see above). To calculate de-
mand change (CDem ), we use amethod similar to the one we use for calculating
fossil fuel decline rates and normalize changes in total electricity demand to




 2 (Equation 4)
where T0 and T1 is the total electricity supply (or demand) at the beginning and
the end of the period respectively.
To characterize a decline episode in terms of fuel substitution, we calculate
the change in each electricity generation source Ci, also normalizing it to the
total electricity system size (Equation 5):
Ci =
Si1  Si0
ðT0 +T1Þ  2 (Equation 5)
We identify the largest and the second largest growing electricity sources.
Then we classify our historical episodes by their primary type of substitution:
fuel switching, where the largest growing electricity source is another fossil
fuel; nuclear substitution, where the largest growing electricity source is nu-
clear power; substitution with renewables, where the largest growing
electricity source is non-hydro renewables; and demand decline, when the to-
tal electricity system shrinks more than the increase in any individual source
(Tables S3 and S4). We also report the secondary type of substitution, which
is the second largest growing electricity source (or demand decline). If both
the first and second largest growing electricity sources are fossil fuels, the
episode is classified only as fuel switching; if the second largest substituting
electricity generation source accounts for less than 10% of the total growth
in growing energy sources, the episode is considered a case of single-source
substitution, and no secondary substitution is reported.
Examining the relationship between decline rate and system size
We examine the relationship between the decline rate and system size by esti-
mating how the maximum observed decline rate varies with the size of theOne Earth 4, 1477–1490, October 22, 2021 1487
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OPEN ACCESS Articleenergy system (Figure 2). We identify the historical maximum rates, which can
be considered a feasibility frontier if only system size is considered, by gener-
ating a spline approximation with the ggplot package in Rstudio using selected
boundary points in Figure 2. In our main analysis, we include regional entities
that are aggregations of national systems. We conduct a sensitivity analysis of
the decline-rate-size relationship where we exclude regional episodes and
only include national decline episodes (Figure S3).
We also test the possibility that the observation of faster decline rates of
smaller entities is simply a statistical artifact and the result of more observa-
tions of smaller systems. To do so, we divide our sample of historically
observed decline episodes into two subsamples using different system size
thresholds (100, 200, and 300 TWh/year) and test the hypothesis that the
rate distributions within the subsamples of larger and smaller systems have
the same characteristics using two statistical tests.
First, we use the non-parametric Anderson-Darling test79 to check the proba-
bility that the twoobserved samples come from the sameunderlyingdistribution.
Thep valueproduced by this test is the probability of getting the observed differ-
encebetween the twoempirical samplesprovided that theycome from the same
distribution (Table S5; Note S1). Second, we test the probability that the obser-
vations in our subsamples of larger systems have the same probability of
exceeding a given decline rate threshold (20%, 25%, or 30%) as the pro-
portion of observations in the smaller systems subsamples exceeding the
same threshold.Weusebinomial distribution80 to estimate the probability of get-
ting theempiricallyobservedorsmallernumberofcasesexceeding the threshold
within the larger systems subsample under this assumption. This produces a p
value that, if small enough,canbeused to reject thenull hypothesis thatepisodes
in both subsamples have the same probability of exceeding the rate threshold.
We repeat each test for different decline rate thresholds (Table S5; Note S1).
Constructing a feasibility space for fossil fuel decline
We construct a feasibility space for fossil fuel decline based on all significant
historical decline episodes (10-year decline rates faster than 5% and average
annual total electricity supply >100 TWh/year: 37 national, five regional, and
one global episode). The coordinates defining the space are 10-year fossil
fuel decline rate and change in total electricity demand over the same period
(both normalized to the average system size). In order to characterize the
strength of historical precedents for different combinations of decline and de-
mand change, we developed a density map based on the number of observa-
tions in each zone and the size of the systems in that zone.
First, we divide the space into discrete bins (5%on the fossil fuel decline axis
and 15% on the demand change axis) and calculate the weighted count of his-
torical episodes (Figure S8A). The episodes are weighted by log-transformed
system size (e.g., the weight for 100 TWh/year is 1, for 1,000 TWh/year it is 2,
for 10,000 TWh/year it is 3) to give more significance to larger entities compa-
rable with regions used in scenarios. We assign the episode GB07-17C with
decline rate 30.1% to the range 25%–30%, and the episode ID07-17Owith de-
mand change 60.1% to the range 45%–60%.
Due to the limited number of observations, the weighted density map pro-
duced this way is discontinuous and has some gaps. Therefore, second, we
produce a smoother augmented map for the purpose of estimating the feasi-
bility of future scenarios. In doing so, we assume that slower decline rates un-
der the same demand change are easier to achieve and hence more feasible;
the same decline rate is more feasible at a slower demand growth (or faster de-
mand decline), since there is less need for substituting outgoing sources.
Therefore, an empirical datapoint within a given bin provides evidence of feasi-
bility not only for that bin but for all bins to the top and/or the left of it in Fig-
ure S8A (with the exception of zone D containing crisis-driven episodes; see
below). For example, a historical episode with decline rate12% and demand
change +17% also provides evidence of feasibility for decline rate 6% and
demand change 0%, even if there is no historical datapoint at the latter pair
of coordinates. Therefore, we calculate an augmented score for each bin by
summing weighted counts across all bins to the right and/or the bottom of it
(i.e., with faster decline rates and/or fasted decline growth), the count for the
bin itself included (Figure S8B).
Third, we identify three feasibility zones based on the augmented scores
from most to least feasible (Figures 4 and S8C) where:
d A: score >101488 One Earth 4, 1477–1490, October 22, 2021d B: 10 > score >0
d C: score = 0 (i.e., no historical precedents)
The area with demand decline faster than15% over 10 years contains only
historical episodes associated with crises; we designate this area as zone D
(Figure S8C). While there are historical precedents of such decline, all of
themwere triggered by the collapse of the Soviet Union, a unique event not en-
visioned in climate change mitigation scenarios.
Finally, we use this feasibility space to map decline of coal and natural gas
for each of the five regions in climate changemitigation scenarios (Figure 5 and
Table 1). In the main text, we focus on coal and natural gas and the time pe-
riods where decline rates are the highest.
Building a heatmap for scenarios
We also use the feasibility space to produce a heatmap for each scenario. To
do so, we project each fuel/region combination for three periods (2020–2030,
2030–2040, and 2040–2050) in each scenario onto the feasibility space and
report the feasibility zone where the decline rate for each fuel/region/time
period combination falls (Data S1). We also include a summary heatmap
with a summary feasibility score for each scenario based on the lowest feasi-
bility score in any fuel/region/time period (Data S1; Table S8), since a feasibility
concern in any fuel/region/time period will decrease the feasibility of the whole
scenario. In producing summary scores, we treat zone D (crisis-driven decline)
as less feasible than zones A and B, but more feasible than zone C (no
precedents).
Calculating age of power plant fleets
To characterize regional and national power plant fleets, we calculate
weighted average age of power plants (Equation 6):
Age =
P




- Year0 is the year for which the average age is calculated
- Yeari is the year when the plant i started operation
- MWi is its installed capacity
The summation is over all plants operating in Year0.
We use World Electric Power Plant database49 and Global Coal Power
Tracker50 as sources of plant age data.
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